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Valuation and Matching: A Conventionalist 
Explanation of Labor Markets by Firms’  
Recruitment Channels 
Guillemette de Larquier & Géraldine Rieucau ∗ 
Abstract: »Valuation und Matching: Eine konventionentheoretische  Erklärung 
der Arbeitsmärkte durch die Rekrutierungskanäle der Unternehmen«. In line 
with the conventionalist works on recruitment and intermediation in the labor 
market, this article argues that, in order to shape uncertainty about the quality 
of matching, recruitment channels used by firms rely on “investments in 
forms.” The first investment corresponds to the definition of the boundaries of 
the labor market (i.e., the outline of the labor supply from the firm’s point of 
view); the second one corresponds to the format of information (i.e., the 
“standard” or “personalized” language used by channels to convey information). 
The firm’s resort to a given channel is explained by its internal organization and 
its valuation of what is a good applicant (depending on its “labor quality con-
vention”). By crossing-over the two types of investment in forms, we distin-
guish four matching dynamics. Each type of dynamics is illustrated by examples 
coming from a qualitative survey of recruitment practices in four French ser-
vice oriented sectors. 
Keywords: Economics of convention, investment in forms, labor quality con-
vention, valuation, recruitment channel, job matching, French labor market, 
service oriented sectors, case studies. 
1.   Introduction 
By analyzing the diversity of recruitment channels in France, our aim is to 
explain the matching dynamics of labor markets. Our approach, based on the 
economics of convention (Eymard-Duvernay et al. 2005; Latsis, de Larquier 
and Bessis 2010; Diaz-Bone and Salais 2011), uses the concept of “investment 
in forms” (Thévenot 1984) and the concept of “valuation” – and its power – 
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(Eymard-Duvernay 2012) to understand how firms by choosing their recruit-
ment channels induce the dynamics of their labor markets. 
Doeringer and Piore (1971) popularized the opposition between external and 
internal labor markets. The aim of institutionalist economists is to highlight the 
administrative rules and procedures within internal labor market (i.e., organiza-
tions) but this literature quite neglects the study of the functioning and dynam-
ics of external labor markets. In the present article, organizations (firms) and 
markets are not regarded as two opposed modes of coordination. The firm has 
to achieve a balance between its different markets (goods, capital, and labor 
markets); as a result it is a mode of coordination of different markets (Eymard-
Duvernay et al. 2005). The intervention of a firm in a given market is the ex-
tension of its internal coordination. In our case, we point out the ways the dy-
namics and the boundaries of the external labor market are constructed by the 
firms’ decisions about recruitment channels: the choice of recruitment channels 
is driven by the operative labor quality convention in the internal labor market, 
that is to say the way of evaluating the quality of labor within the organization. 
Employers’ decisions on recruitment channels, criteria and tools play a role in 
delimiting who is employable and who is not (Eymard-Duvernay and Marchal 
1997; Lendaro and Imdorf 2012; Rieucau and Salognon 2014; Larquier and 
Marchal 2016; Imdorf 2017; Ali and Brandl 2018; Nadai, Gonon and Rotzetter 
2018), that means who is valuable and who is not, hence the power of valuation. 
Thus, external and internal labor markets’ dynamics are linked by the way firms 
judge the quality of labor and by the way channels convey firms’ valuations. 
Matching dynamics vary according to the ways the channels operate. In or-
der to shape uncertainty about the quality of matching, channels rely on “in-
vestments in forms” (Thévenot 1984). Investments in forms are rules, tools, 
contracts implemented by firms, labor institutions and channels to stabilize 
labor market interactions and selection: diploma, vocational qualifications, 
nomenclatures, applications forms, input fields and keywords in websites, etc.  
First, investments in forms are needed to delimit the outlines of the labor 
supply the firm is looking for (i.e., the boundaries of the external labor market). 
If boundaries are well defined and stabilized (by diploma for example), the 
firm knows the place to meet applicants and the recruitment channel – as online 
job advertisements – can be routinely or mechanically used to reach them. If 
labor market boundaries are not stabilized by investments in forms, the exist-
ence of labor supply itself is questioned by the uncertainty about its quality. 
What are the critical qualities needed to be considered as employable, i.e., as a 
potential applicant? In this case, the recruitment channel plays a critical role in 
designing the relevant labor supply and it is expected to be an intermediary 
specifically delegated by the firm. 
The second type of investment in forms concerns the information produced 
and conveyed by the channel. The “format” in which information circulates in 
the labor market (Thévenot 1997, 2007) may be standardized (CVs, diploma, 
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etc.) or personalized (informal discussion). Each type of channel has its proper 
way to shape and convey information about the applicant’s qualities and em-
ployer’s requirements. 
Finally, the diversity of investments in forms that stabilize the process of 
matching via channels induces different types of labor markets dynamics. By 
crossing-over the two types of investment in forms, four matching dynamics 
are characterized (Larquier and Rieucau 2014). These dynamics rely alterna-
tively on (1) the circulation of already stabilized information (2) the creation of 
a labor supply concomitant with (and not prior to) matching (3) trust shown by 
acquaintances and (4) referrals conveyed by professional networks. In the first 
case, the matching dynamics are conveyed by tools, in the second by institu-
tional partnerships and in the other two cases by people, who may be either 
close acquaintances or members of the professional sphere. We develop this 
argument by drawing on a qualitative survey of recruitment practices in four 
service sectors: information technology (IT), banking, catering, and retailing. 
 
Methodology 
The research reported is a part of a project regarding recruitment practices and 
selectivity supported by the French Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare (Dares) 
and the Défenseur des droits (Human Rights Defender). The research was con-
ducted in 2010-2011 and was coordinated by the Centre d’études de l’emploi 
(Centre for Employment Studies). The empirical and sector-based approach 
adopted allows us to emphasis connections between internal organizations and 
recruitment practices. The four sectors studied were Information Technology (IT) 
(Fondeur 2013), banking (Larquier and Tuchszirer 2013), catering (Forté and 
Monchatre 2013), and retailing (Rieucau and Salognon 2013). Despite the crisis, 
there were many job opportunities in these sectors. A total of 99 semi-structured 
interviews were conducted with recruiters (Human Resources (HR) personnel, 
managers, or employees involved in recruitment), employees, and labor market 
intermediaries (the public employment agency: Pôle emploi, and private agen-
cies) in about 10 firms in each sector. The interviews were conducted in Greater 
Paris except for those in catering conducted in the city of Strasbourg and its 
surrounding area. The face-to-face interviews were based on guidelines adapted 
to the type of the respondent (recruiter, employee, intermediary); they were 
taped, transcribed verbatim, and interpreted after being read through many 
times and compared. A team of two researchers conducted the interviews for 
each of the four sector-based monographs.
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2. How Firms' Recruitment Channels Shape Labor Markets 
Ever since George Stigler’s article (1962), mainstream economists have con-
sidered that the labor market presents high transaction costs for workers and 
employers. Interactions in the labor market are subject to uncertainty because it 
is impossible to ascertain the quality of a match before experiencing it. In this 
context, employers choose their recruitment channels (including institutional 
intermediaries, job advertisements, social networks, and unsolicited applica-
tions) as means to collect information and to reduce the risk of a bad match. 
There is a trade-off between the cost of more information about the quality of 
applicants and the benefits of selecting the perfect or best candidate. Firms may 
be committed in sub-optimal hiring procedures, but, from the economic rational 
point of view, learning over time should move them toward adopting more 
efficient methods (Holzer 1987). 
Thus, in mainstream economics, recruitment channels reduce transactions 
cost by conveying information about applicants and jobs (DeVaro 2008). We 
do not deny this dimension of their function, but from our point of view, this is 
only true in specific situations. Channels just convey information between 
applicants and firms only when a definition of the relevant quality (the object 
of the information) has been well established for all actors in the labor market. 
Actually, it is the case in mainstream economics where quality is given, i.e., 
exogenous. According to our conventionalist approach – regarding quality as 
relying on conventions – recruitment channels used by firms not only collect 
information about the labor supply that firms are looking for, they also shape 
the firms’ (external) labor markets by delimiting and qualifying the relevant 
labor supply that firms are able to value. This part explains this last assertion in 
three sections. 
2.1 The Uncertainties of Recruiters and the Needs for Investments 
in Forms 
According to the approach of economics of convention (EC), qualities of goods 
and persons are not given and objective facts. Their values do not depend on 
the subjective and given preferences of rational individuals (Eymard-Duvernay 
et al. 2005). EC regards qualities and rationalities not as given but as endoge-
nous; they depend on conventions (Diaz-Bone and Salais 2011, 9). Conven-
tions are ranges of “consistent interpretations and practices that agents assume 
to be shared (to some degree) by the other participants in the interaction” 
(Latsis, de Larquier and Bessis 2010, 554). Conventions have to be distin-
guished from subjective representations because they are hypothetically shared. 
Moreover, conventions rely on normative judgments about the correct or ac-
ceptable collective functioning, implying a specific conception of justice and 
vision of the common good (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006). Thus, EC consid-
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ers that conventions allow individuals to identify the appropriate action in a 
social situation but the uncertainty of the coordination is only “shaped” and 
never “resolved” since the effective share of the same representation cannot be 
guaranteed (Latsis, de Larquier and Bessis 2010, 558). In particular, the quality 
of goods and persons is not a resolved issue because there are several orders of 
“worth” (grandeur in French) that people can justify (Boltanski and Thévenot 
2006). In this pragmatic perspective developed by Luc Boltanski and Laurent 
Thévenot, it is not only a cognitive issue: “worth” can be tested and proved by 
cognitive formats, procedures, and tools that equip social situations (Diaz-Bone 
and Salais 2011, 22). 
In the labor market, EC regards hiring as such an uncertain situation where 
recruiters have to “qualify” labor and workers who do not have worth per se 
(Eymard-Duvernay and Marchal 1997; Salognon, 2007; Marchal 2013; Lar-
quier and Marchal 2016; Larquier 2016; Nadai, Gonon and Rotzetter 2018). 
The ways recruiters define, interpret and assess applicants’ qualities rely on a 
“labor quality convention”: they imply conventional judgments of what makes 
a “good candidate.” Consequently, the applicants’ worth depends on the choice 
of recruitment and assessment methods, on the way of using them, and on the 
type of actors involved in the process (Larquier and Marchal 2016; Ali and 
Brandl 2018). Typically, the hiring process is a “trial” (Boltanski and Chiapello 
2005), that is to say a social arrangement organizing the test of people’s abili-
ties resulting in their ranking. In fact, it is an “institutionalized trial” because 
this trial justifies the distribution of social goods (in our case, jobs) to people 
according to their ranking. Thus, the hiring process needs to be a legitimate 
trial to “confer legitimacy on the social system instituted by it” (Bourguignon 
and Chiapello 2005, 669): who gets a job and who remains unemployed. The 
selected candidates have to be “credible and legitimate in the eyes of others” 
(Imdorf 2017, 410): employees, hierarchy, customers, business and public 
partners and… researchers!1 Recruiters and employers have to explain them-
selves to ensure coordination and cooperation inside and outside the firm. 
The regularity of hiring practices is not the result of an optimal trade-off as 
mainstream economics explains it. As long as hiring practices seem to be effi-
cient in the coordination (they avoid serious hiring failures from recruiters’ 
interpretation) and legitimate (there is no strong critics about their organization 
and their outcome),2 recruiters have no reason to change their way of valuing 
applicants. Finally, given these conditions – no failure of efficiency and of 
legitimacy – recruiters in firms have the power of valuation (Eymard-Duvernay 
                                                             
1  The need for legitimacy may explain the relative ease of recruiters when they justify their 
practices to researchers in surveys. 
2  If a trial considered as legitimate is criticized, the organisers of the trial cannot be unreac-
tive, because the trial itself has to justify the (unequal) distribution of social goods (Bour-
guignon and Chiapello 2005, 675). 
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2012): in the labor markets, actors accept that employers can decide who is 
valuable and who is not. Their labor quality conventions are diffused in the 
labor market and the applicants have to adjust themselves to these quality con-
ventions. How? It is the function of recruitment channels. 
How recruiters organize inside the firm the valuation process of candidates 
who have applied is the research issue of Guillemette de Larquier and Emman-
uelle Marchal (2016). The aim of this article is to provide light about the way 
recruiters organize the recruitment phase outside the firm. How do they reach 
the labor supply they are looking for? How do they meet the labor supply cor-
responding to their labor quality conventions? How do they avoid the people 
they consider unemployable? Obviously, it depends on the recruitment chan-
nels. From a firm’s point of view, the labor market has the characteristics given 
by the recruitment channels that the firm uses. The boundaries of the labor 
market coincide with the limits of the labor supply reached by channels and the 
quality of demands and supplies is described by the information formatted by 
channels. The labor market – in other words, the uncertainty outside the firms – 
is shaped by the recruitment channels. In this perspective, the regular use of a 
given channel can be explained by the coherence between the labor quality 
convention of the firm and the shape of labor market by the channel. 
According to EC, in order to stabilize their coordination, actors shape uncer-
tainty by relying on investments in forms (Thévenot 1984, 2007, 2016). In-
vestment is defined in economics as a detour of production (a present cost) that 
increases capital (material, financial, and human) with the expectation of a 
future benefit. Laurent Thévenot (1984) suggested extending the idea of pro-
ductive investment to rules, norms, contracts, and brands implemented by firms 
and institutions. These shaping operations and these tools are detours of pro-
duction that secure greater stability and generality in trade and production, 
making them less dependent on individual thought and action. The Rome code 
(Répertoire opérationnel des métiers et des emplois – operational repertory of 
occupations and jobs) used by the French public employment agency is a good 
illustration of investment in forms. It produces equivalence between jobs across 
time and space to stabilize the nomenclature of jobs used by caseworkers, 
firms, and applicants in their interactions. The Rome code is regularly the ob-
ject of critiques by its users (recruiters and unemployed workers) and it has 
been revised several times according to different logics of competencies, but it 
remains the public and free-of-charge repertory of jobs in France. 
Finally, by using a given channel, employers and workers base their decisions 
and actions on the investments in forms embedded in that channel. The func-
tioning of each channel needs preliminary investments in material and socio-
cognitive forms, then the actors have to bring the relevant information into 
those investments in forms (to “in-form”) (Diaz-Bone 2015, 28). The objective 
is to coordinate the representations of the labor market and to make possible 
the formation of matches between firms and workers. Given the power of valu-
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ation of the firms, investments in forms embedded in channels are expected to 
be coherent with the employers’ labor quality conventions, even if channels as 
“gatekeepers” can negotiate hiring criteria with employers (Lendaro and Im-
dorf 2012). Hence, recruitment channels as intermediaries contribute to expand 
the firms’ equivalences and conventions from situation to situation in the labor 
market (Bessy and Chauvin 2013, 99; Diaz-Bone 2016, 59).3 
The next sections highlight two investments in form that the channel needs 
to shape uncertainty: (1) the market boundaries – which are jointly produced by 
workers, firms, education and training systems, and channels – and (2) the 
format of information used by the channels. 
2.2  Delimiting the Labor Supply: The Boundaries of the (External) 
Labor Market 
When firms have to hire, either they know in what market the labor supply is 
located or they have to search where relevant applicants are. In the first case, 
the investments in forms made by firms, education and training systems, workers 
and recruitment channels have already stabilized the market boundaries. The 
firm deals with a ready-made labor supply. In the second case, the market 
boundaries are poorly defined and the issue is to attract or even to create a 
supply that is not already there. This involves shaping the labor supply, an 
operation in which the recruitment channels play a major part. 
While the concept of internal labor market is well defined by Doeringer and 
Piore (1971), this is far for being the case for the concept of external labor 
market. From the first lines of their book, Doeringer and Piore specify that a 
distinction must be drawn between the internal labor market governed by a “set 
of administrative rules and procedures” and the external market of “conven-
tional economic theory” governed by economic variables, the two markets 
being interconnected by ports of entry and exit. This opposition is similar to the 
classic opposition, since Ronald Coase’s article (1937), between market and 
organization as two distinct modes of coordination. As an internal labor mar-
ket, a firm is an “anti-market organization” (Favereau 1989), and it is hardly 
satisfactory to consider that its port of entry are open in a market as modeled by 
mainstream economists, that is, a market more or less governed by the laws of 
perfect competition. Actually, the vacancies (their number and their qualities) 
                                                             
3  Other investments in forms are critical for the recruiters’ activity: the law asserting the 
principles of specialty, good faith, transparency, and relevancy of the hiring methods and 
the anti-discrimination law. EC considers law not only as constraint; law is an incomplete 
institution that has to be interpreted in situations (Diaz-Bone 2015). Moreover, the respect 
of law is not sufficient to make the hiring trial legitimate (Marchal 2013). Thus, there are 
indeed illegal ways of valuating applicants but there is a plurality of legitimate interpreta-
tions of law depending on the firms’ power of valuation. 
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open in the external market reflect the decisions of the internal market (Dunlop 
1966, 36). 
Our objective is to understand the functioning of external labor markets as 
an extension of the firm’s internal organization. A firm is not only another 
mode of coordination than a market (hierarchy and rules versus price system): 
“[…] the firm organizes the articulation between goods, labor and capital mar-
kets” (Eymard-Duvernay et al. 2005, 25). Depending on the firm’s internal 
organization of the activity, the labor market boundaries – that is, the outlines 
of the labor supply – may be either narrowly defined or permeable or even non-
existent. These three cases correspond to the three markets identified by 
Marsden (1991): occupational labor market, internal labor market, and non-
organized market.4 
In occupational markets where qualifications can be transferred from one 
firm to another regardless of the position (Eyraud, Marsden and Silvestre 1990), 
the labor supply is clearly delimited by investments in forms in qualifications or 
certified diplomas previously put in place and negotiated by workers, firms, and 
authorities. For hiring, the channel or the intermediary is therefore mobilized to 
reach a well-targeted audience. Either the audience is large and the channel is 
able to advertise the job offers over the media read or visited by the profession-
als being sought, or the audience is smaller and the channel like professional 
networks or head-hunters reach the wanted candidate. 
Firms organized into internal labor markets that enhance qualifications 
through training and internal mobility recruit via specific ports of entry and 
draw on a market with more permeable boundaries (Eyraud, Marsden and 
Silvestre 1990). To join an internal market the level of education (as a marker 
of potential career) is more relevant than the specific type of diploma. The 
major companies in the four sectors of the survey will regularly draw on a 
ready-made labor supply but they are also prepared to move away from their 
usual external market. This is the case of retail banks that extend their market 
to all type of undergraduates (2-3 years after the Baccalauréat) with some 
commercial background without confining themselves to banking curriculum 
(Larquier and Tuchszirer 2013). To achieve this, they activate numerous chan-
nels that open up the market, such as Pôle emploi,5 or they organize special 
“open day” type operations. In this case, firms open up to a labor force that is 
not qualified by holding some specific title or diploma but one that they will 
train up themselves once recruited. 
                                                             
4  In 1954, Clark Kerr had already opposed labor markets “indefinite in their specification of 
the sellers and the buyers” (Kerr 1954, 93) and “institutional markets”: “their dimensions are 
set not by the whims of workers and employers but by rules” (ibid., 93). And among these 
structured labor markets, he distinguished craft and production systems that correspond 
roughly to the occupational and internal labor markets described by David Marsden. 
5  Pôle emploi (previously ANPE, Agence Nationale pour l’Emploi) is the French public em-
ployment agency. Website: <pole-emploi.fr>. 
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Last, the non-organized market, is one on which no investment in forms has 
been made to qualify workers and these ones a priori are entirely interchangea-
ble. Firms are prepared to tap into any workforce and judge it on skills (for 
example, interpersonal skills or uptime) which do not matter as qualifications 
for delimiting a market. Actually, it is the market of “unskilled” labor (Marsden 
1991). The recruitment channel must therefore define, create, and shape the 
quality of the applicants to be presented to firms. This is the case when the 
company relies on public programs designed to assist low-skilled or long-term 
unemployed people to get a job. These programs rearrange the employer’s 
requirements and the selection process in order to reveal abilities needed to 
hold the job. This is also the case of the restaurant employee who recommends 
a family member for seasonal work. 
2.3 Qualifying the Labor Supply: The Format of Information 
The second type of investment in forms concerns the information formatted 
and used by the channel, which may be standardized or personalized. Each type 
of channel has a way to shape and conveys information about the candidate’s 
abilities and employer’s requirements. 
Albert Rees (1966) differentiated channels in terms of the scope and the 
quality of the information supplied. He drew a distinction between “extensive” 
and “intensive” search channels. In the first case, the channels like job adver-
tisements provide a large number of applications but limited information on 
each applicant. In the second case, channels like social networks supply in-
depth and detailed information about a small number of applicants. Extensive 
and intensive searches may be combined, for example when recruitment is built 
around a relation of trust between a job center and a firm. This first distinction 
by Rees is fruitful; it is a first step to overcome the common approach of in-
formation only in terms of diffusion. Here we propose to add a dimension by 
focusing on the format in which information circulates in the labor market 
(Thévenot 1997, 2007). Coordination markers between the market actors differ 
depending on whether they circulate in a standard format (for example, CVs, 
applications forms, and job classifications) or in a personalized format (for 
example, narrative recommendation and non-standard written forms conveyed 
by networks; see Eymard-Duvernay and Marchal 1997; Marchal, Mellet and 
Rieucau 2007). To value the quality of the applicants, recruiters have to use the 
same format of information than the channels; they have to share the same 
language, the same way of communicating – with its original meaning of tak-
ing part in a common matter (Thévenot 2007). Thus, the firm’s choice of any 
particular channel and information format depends on the human resources 
(personnel, tools, etc.) that are available for the phase of screening inside the 
firm (Larquier and Marchal 2016) in conformity with its labor quality conven-
tion. 
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Because they have substantial HR facilities and services, banks can easily 
use channels that provide a large number of applications in the form of written 
résumés, typically CVs and forms that directly transmit the diploma infor-
mation. Bank recruiters can then add more detailed information about the quali-
ty of applicants, since their selection process based on tests and interviews only 
begins at this stage. For IT companies, CV libraries and job boards convey 
information about diplomas and competencies with computer tools in standard 
format. In addition, the language used on such sites, whether for consulting CV 
libraries or advertising job vacancies is familiar to computer scientists, appli-
cants and recruiters: posting a CV, regularly refreshing a page, creating alerts 
and so on. 
On the contrary, employees are hired for retailing and catering positions ra-
ther via channels that reduce the impact of CVs and give precedence to a per-
sonalized information format. This is the case when applications are handed in 
personally by applicants to the extent that this often provides an opportunity for 
an informal discussion. The personalized format also prevails when an existing 
employee recommends an acquaintance, which is common practice in these 
sectors where recruitment is often a matter of some urgency. Unsolicited appli-
cations and networks enable firms to recruit quickly and cheaply. The personal-
ized information format is typical of informal organizations, where recruitment 
is done by branch managers or their deputies, who are on the workplace every 
day and know their local labor market well although they are not specialists in 
human resources (Lockyer and Scholarios 2004; Nickson et al. 2012). 
3. Four Matching Dynamics 
In this part, we characterize four matching dynamics by crossing-over the two 
types of investment in forms embedded in recruitment channels (cf. Table 1). 
These dynamics rely alternatively on (1) the circulation of already (i.e., prior to 
the match) stabilized information about applicants (2) the construction of the 
labor supply’s boundaries concomitant with matching (and not prior to 
matching) (3) personal information conveyed by walk-in applications and local 
social networks in a non-organized and open market and (4) trusted 
information conveyed by referrals and professional networks in a closed 
market. In the first case, the matching dynamics are conveyed by tools, in the 
second by institutional partnerships, and in the other two cases by individuals 
who may be the applicant him/herself, close relationships (strong ties), or 
people from occupational sphere. The resort to a given type of recruitment 
channel is explained by the firm’s internal organization: the way of 
coordinating its production and trade and the way of valuing and judging the 
workforce. 
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Table 1: Types of Recruitment Channels according to the Investments in Form 
 Standardized information Personalized information 
Well-defined/stabilized 
labor market outlines 
Corporate websites;  
online job advertisements 
Referrals and professional 
networks; head-hunter 
Not stabilized labor market 
outlines  
Institutional partnerships 
with Pôle emploi and 
schools 
Walk-in application and 
personal networks 
3.1  Matching of Labor Demands and Supplies on Stabilized 
Criteria 
When a firm uses a channel in order to attract a labor supply that is already 
formed and defined by standard criteria, the market is conceived as a stabilized 
space – its boundaries are well-defined – in which standardized information 
circulates about quite generic supplies and demands. In this case, the firm ex-
pects the channel to be a “pipe” which just conveys information flows. The 
channel (for instance the job board) shapes and distorts the information in order 
to give it a format able to fit with the pipe but when the firm chooses to use the 
channel, the distortion is already made by stabilized investment in forms. Then, 
the selection process relies on stabilized, even hard-and-fast criteria, such as 
the diploma and/or experience, which may be eliminatory pre-requisites. 
The characteristics of a “suitable applicant” are described by marker posts 
that derive their legitimacy from being constructed within a professional or 
academic world. To apply, one must share the language of the world to which 
he/she tries to belong and must know its codes: for instance, the applicant is 
required to be fluent in English, to know specific job titles in banking sector, to 
be familiar with IT languages and tools used by IT job boards, or to have the 
diploma or the experience required to work in retailing and catering. The objec-
tive of the firm is to reach and select a “ready-made supply” with boundaries 
and characteristics well-defined by qualifications and diploma. These “mark-
ers” are those hold by workers in the sector and are written in job advertise-
ments and CVs. These markers have particularly rigid forms when they are 
written in job advertisements posted on the Internet, and online recruitment can 
be very tool-dependent. Indeed, on job boards and corporate websites, infor-
mation available to applicants is subject to a high degree of codification 
achieved through keywords, input fields, or predefined lists. According to an IT 
company’s manager, “keywords act as the recruiting agents.” The presence of 
predetermined fields and lists may encourage advertisements writers (the re-
cruiters) to automatically fill them in. 
Evidence suggests that the Internet (compared to print media) contributes to 
increased requirements, standardization and quantification of the criteria in job 
advertisements (Marchal, Mellet and Rieucau 2007). As a result, exclusion may 
be very pronounced through these channels. Screening based on CV – especial-
ly when they are posted on websites – requires the job seeker to adapt 
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him/herself to the way the site is structured and to send the right signals in 
order to be matched to the advertisement requirements. People who are not 
computer literate and who have not the required standards are not able to apply 
and there is no room to avoid the rules and the tools. The Internet enhances the 
number of candidates and reinforces the competition. When solicited, interme-
diaries (job center and even the Apec – Association pour l’emploi des cadres, 
the French employment agency for managers) act merely as “information pro-
viders” (Bessy and Larquier 2010; Bonet, Cappelli and Hamori 2013), but they 
do not call the practices into question. They cannot shift the lines and the out-
lines of the profiles sought. 
In some respects, this type of matching dynamics can be regarded as standard, 
close to that described in mainstream economics. Information is conveyed by 
“signals” (Spence 1973) from applicants’ CVs, which are supposed to inform 
firms about their productivity. The objectives of the intermediaries and web-
sites are to provide instant access to important flows of information, to increase 
the number and the pace of matches between firms and job seekers and there-
fore to reduce frictional unemployment (Autor 2009). However, in the standard 
dynamics, firms (in particular, small ones) and people (in particular, low-
skilled ones) may have difficulties to qualify their vacancies or abilities in the 
required stabilized language. 
3.2  Creation of a Labor Supply in Partnership with an Institutional 
Intermediary 
The second type of matching dynamics also relies on standardized information 
but the outlines of the labor supply are poorly defined. This is the case when a 
firm, claiming to face difficulties in attracting and retaining workers, enters 
into a partnership with an institutional intermediary to select a workforce. This 
workforce is not regarded as immediately able to hold the job but applicants 
would become “employable” through the guarantee provided by the intermediary. 
The language spoken by the firm and the channel remains in a standard form 
because the firm mandates the channels, which are institutions (Pôle emploi or 
schools), to produce standardized information about applicants and vacancies. 
In one of our case studies, to attract suitable sales representatives who do 
not especially think to work in a bank nor apply to bank corporate websites, a 
Parisian retail bank turns away from its “natural market” (recent graduates 
from banking courses) by soliciting Pôle emploi. Pôle emploi’s “coded” lan-
guage is regarded as relevant to screen applications for receptionists and to 
send them to the bank’s HR department in order to be screened. In addition, 
according to the staff in charge of recruitment in the bank, the agent of Pôle 
emploi is highly competent because she knows very well the world of the bank, 
thanks to her 20 years of experience in connecting demands and supplies in this 
sector in Greater Paris. The CVs she sends to the bank are suited to its expecta-
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tions for finding sales representatives who do not come from their usual channels. 
She even takes up the CVs and letters of motivation of applicants to compare 
them with recruiters’ expectations, changing for example a general CV job title 
and acting as an interpreter between a labor supply, that is a priori not entirely 
fitted, and the bank’s demand. As a result, she opens up the market to profiles 
that, according to her, would not be chosen through the corporate website. By 
contrast to the prior case, the characteristics and outlines of the profiles are 
subject of discussions and negotiation between the firm and the intermediary. 
Another example comes from retail and catering firms which rely on Pôle 
emploi, on apprentice training schools or other vocational schools, in order to 
reach a labor supply that is not already existent. This can be done through the 
recruitment by simulation method (Méthode de Recrutement par Simulation: 
MRS). This innovative program has been created by Pôle emploi with two 
objectives: on the one hand, to discourage discriminatory practices and to help 
the low-skilled and unemployed people to access to jobs without required expe-
rience and on the other hand, to help firms that face difficulties in recruiting or 
have no time to devote to recruitment to fill vacancies. In several companies 
surveyed, the MRS emerged as a current way of recruiting people for low-wage 
positions especially for a shop/restaurant opening. The core issue of the pro-
gram is to select through the “abilities” needed to perform the job. Applicants 
have to pass practical exercises. For example, candidates for general assistant 
positions in a store have to fill shelves within a limited time, whereas candi-
dates for cashier positions have to complete exercises simulating the check-out 
process in a simulated shop environment (sound atmosphere and interruptions 
by fictitious customers or colleagues). Both technical and communicational 
skills are assessed. The successful candidates then attend a job interview at the 
workplace, conducted in theory without CV as the recruiter is supposed to only 
comment exercise scores and to assess the applicant’s commitment. In practice, 
the CV is often used but such a use strongly differs from the case exposed in 
the prior dynamics: it only serves to start the discussion and it is read in pres-
ence of the applicant. A success in the exercises – often called “tests” by the 
recruiters rather than “exercises” – acts as a guarantee that the job seeker has 
the skills to perform the job; passing the tests is thus a form of certification 
(Rieucau and Salognon 2014). In this case, the risks of CV-based selection led 
Pôle emploi to enhance such a demand-side oriented program (Salognon 2007). 
The key success is a partnership with employers in order to overcome the clas-
sic selection based on CVs, which disadvantages long-term unemployed people 
(Manning 2000). 
Vocational schools and colleges, as obvious actors in workforce education 
and training, may also contribute directly to open the market. The catering 
positions (cooks, pastry cooks, wine waiters, and so on) are regarded as diffi-
cult to fill and the industry then enhances close ties between employers and 
apprentice training centers, schools and vocational colleges. By hiring and 
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training up young apprentices and trainees, independent establishments, hotel 
and catering chains help to form a pool of professionals. In this tight labor 
market, employers cannot activate a channel that would connect them to a large 
market of ready-made and qualified workforce, as in the previous standard 
dynamics. Hiring therefore needs to involve a partner to train the labor supply. 
In this dynamics, matching consists in creating and training a pool of appli-
cants that does not already exist. Employers’ hiring practices are more flexible 
than in the previous case. Resorting to a channel necessarily takes the form of a 
partnership, of mounting an operation that takes time and may involve various 
types of actors: firms, public-sector intermediaries, local authorities, training 
centers. They are not only “matchmakers” (Bonet, Cappelli and Hamori 2013); 
firms ask them to train the profiles they need, and to discard routines so as to 
open up to new profiles. Acquiring a common language and cooperation may 
be, however, a long and complicated process. There is a risk that recruiters and 
intermediaries fail to understand each other and to succeed in working together. 
3.3  Reliance upon a Non-Organized and Open Labor Market 
In the third type of matching dynamics, the market’s boundaries are poorly 
defined and the information is personalized. Channels capture a workforce with 
undefined outlines because their markets have never been “organized” in 
Marsden (1991) signification. Here institutional intermediaries are not solicited 
in order to formalize connections and evaluations, as in the prior case. The 
personalized information is conveyed by narrative during face-to-face interac-
tions and the intermediary, if required, is a person who introduces the appli-
cant. Two main channels involved are walk-in applications and local and per-
sonal networks. The likelihood of a match relies on the confidence the 
employer accords to the employee or the acquaintance who recommends an 
applicant (personal networks) or to his/her feeling during the first interaction 
with the applicant who comes straight to him/her at the workplace (hand-
delivered application). 
In retailing and catering, recruiters are accustomed to using word-of-mouth, 
soliciting their own employees, displaying announcements in the shop windows 
and receiving walk-in applications. These popular channels are inexpensive and 
target applicants who live close to the restaurant/the store, who do not face 
commuting delays and will likely accept the non-standard working times of 
these sectors (Forté and Monchatre 2013; Rieucau 2015). In addition, these 
channels are adapted to staff turnover, which is especially high in retail and 
catering. Indeed, they provide continuous candidates and the selection, under-
taken by a manager in the store or the restaurant requires limited time. These 
channels (word-of-mouth or face-to-face interactions) mostly conform to the 
personalized format of narrative. CVs are not critical and when it is hand-
delivered, the applicant has the opportunity to enhance his/her application 
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during an informal discussion with a person in charge of the recruitment. Dur-
ing this short interaction, critical information from the employer’s perspective 
is gathered (applicant’s availability and experience). For low-skilled positions 
in service oriented sectors, communication skills, attitude, and physical appear-
ance matter and are evaluated during the face-to-face interactions (Nickson et 
al. 2012). The words used by the employee who gives a CV to the person in 
charge of recruiting in a hypermarket are instructive: “Here, a student – a nice 
young girl – just gave me her CV this morning; she’s free on Mondays and 
Tuesdays.” In a few words, everything has been said: the incidental “nice 
young girl” attests that the look of the candidate is judged suitable, her availa-
bility is known, and it is imaginable she may be flexible, as she is a student 
(Rieucau and Salognon 2013). 
Catering chains especially rely on strong ties who are family, friends, and 
relatives (Granovetter 1973) because they need to broaden their labor “pool” 
and to vary the potential candidates. Their difficulties to recruit are due to the 
tight labor market and poor resources devoted to recruitment. However, as the 
literature pointed out (Ioannides and Datcher Loury 2004), local networks work 
only if they provide reliable information from trusted referrals. The interviews 
reveal that unlike professional networks (see below), local networks provide 
little guarantee about the quality of candidates. Employers might have doubts 
about the future working relationship if their employees belong to the same 
family and they might reject applicants suspected of being recommended by 
their “gang of mates” from some difficult inner-city areas. Anyone can help in 
making a match but the absence of “quality” proximity networks thwarts any 
matching. 
3.4  Recommendation in a Professional Sphere 
In the final case, the firm approaches a market with well-stabilized boundaries, 
as in the standard dynamics but using a personalized format of information. 
The firm already knows what kind of workforce it is looking for, however, to 
reach this labor supply, the firm does not go through the channel of the standard 
dynamics, which would make its search public, but solicits its professional 
networks. This channel differs from local networks, there is no doubt about the 
fact that the person who recommends is a trusted advisor. The decision about 
matching also depends on personalized information but the professional lan-
guage is shared and well-understood by the firms and the intermediary (the 
person who recommends). The latter provides their guarantee as a professional 
to the former. These professional networks (in catering, merchant banking, and 
the IT sector) work in an occupational market (Marsden 1991) in which quali-
fied labor can be transferred from one firm to another. Recruiters draw on a 
closed market that is already formed and above all familiar: everyone knows 
everyone else in the “small world” of banking or within the regional networks 
HSR 44 (2019) 1  │  67 
of hotels and catering, and alumni of the same schools or computer science 
colleagues recognize each other. 
The catering sector is characterized by marked mobility of employees from 
one restaurant to another and these employees form a supply from which the 
firms can draw. Professional networks are an original way to select from this 
supply. Restaurant managers who are independent (they do not work for restau-
rant chains) regularly exchange information about particular applications, dur-
ing more or less formal meetings. As a result, this channel is quite organized 
and relies on shared codes (diploma, school where it was obtained, place in 
which the person worked, etc.). Through information transmitted by narrative, 
one can explain the career path of workers, whereas it is not the case with a CV 
posted on a website or through an employment agency counselor. 
For sales executives in corporate and investment banking, network contacts 
(the “small world” of the profession) are able to bring to light a specific profile, 
which might appear trivial in a résumé. Even if the firm solicits and pays a 
head-hunter, this one does not find out an original profile but tries to discreetly 
hire a manager who works in a similar competing company (Gautié, Godechot 
and Sorignet 2005; Larquier and Tuchszirer 2013). The bank asks the head-
hunter to mobilize professional networks. In IT companies, the co-optation 
channel (current employees are paid when they recommend suitable applicants) 
relies on professional contacts as in the small world of corporate and invest-
ment banks, where evaluations are made among peers. However, IT companies 
are a less prestigious work environment. The programmer who recommends 
another one shares the same technical language and can also, in a more every-
day language, persuade him/her to work in one company rather than another, as 
all “small” IT companies look alike from applicants’ point of view (Fondeur 
2013, 117):  
They bring us people who match with the company culture because of close 
proximity between them; they had prior discussions and entrants have a good 
knowledge of the company when they come (Recruitment manager, IT firm). 
This final matching dynamics is potentially highly selective because it excludes 
all those who do not belong to professional networks. Adopting the right lan-
guage also supposes to be introduced or referred by one of the members of this 
“small world.” It is the professionals themselves who are the relevant interme-
diaries for matching. Knowing codes and language (as in the first standard 
dynamics) is a necessary albeit not sufficient condition to get a job. However, 
the applicant’s profile varies according to the definition of a good match, which 
is not set within standard formats.  
HSR 44 (2019) 1  │  68 
4.  Conclusion 
In this article we have tried to define what external labor markets are, not in 
opposition to the internal labor market functioning, but as the matching dynamics 
shaped by four types of recruitment channels. The specificities of the four 
matching dynamics, related to the needs of firms, imply that these dynamics 
cannot be classed according to a single dimension. In particular, it would be 
damaging to consider that the last three cases are less efficient than the first 
standard one (close to the representation of labor market as modeled by main-
stream economics), because their channels convey flows of information in a 
less massive and extended way. Switching from one type of dynamics to an-
other requires qualitative and not quantitative leaps. Actually, the link between 
a firm and a type of external labor market is not fixed and might evolve. In 
particular, a firm can change its channels because of coordination failures or 
critiques. 
In large firms, human resources staff may criticize the traditional channels 
and implement online recruitment practices, which are regarded as a better and 
more efficient way to match vacancies and applicants. For example, food retail 
chains traditionally use channels based on reliance in a non-organized market. 
Walk-ins enable job seekers to enhance their qualities and to submit their CV at 
the right time and to the right person. But there is a risk that unfair and discrim-
inatory judgment occurs at a very early stage during the informal meeting with 
the store manager. By implementing formal and standard channels (online 
applications) and by decreasing the weight of “feeling” and “first impression,” 
the selection performed by human resources reduces unfair and discriminatory 
judgment. Nevertheless, the standard channels prioritize signals such as experi-
ence and often requires computer literacy; the online recruitment scheme may 
be interpreted as a way to target students and a younger workforce in super-
markets and superstores (Rieucau 2015). Unemployed and unqualified job 
seekers may be excluded but the labor supply of part-time working students 
seem to constitute the perfect candidates that food retail chains value in their 
work organization and the Internet is the relevant channel to reach them. 
To conclude, let us consider the case of change because of workforce short-
age. This is an important issue for the public employment agency faced with 
firms suffering from recruitment difficulties. When firms resort to channels of 
the standard dynamics and fail to find the labor supply they are looking for, it is 
pointless to put into question the capacity of Pôle emploi’s website to dissemi-
nate information (Bessy and Larquier 2010). Other operations must be encour-
aged involving more costly partnerships to create a labor supply to match the 
firms’ demands. In other cases of coordination failures, when small firms are 
used to hiring by word-of-mouth but have no more networks to contact, they 
also might engage in such partnerships. But this involves bringing closer to-
gether their personalized language and the standardized language of the institu-
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tional intermediaries like Pôle emploi or schools. As the change of recruitment 
channel implies the change of the way of qualifying workforce, switching from 
a type of dynamics based on personalized language to another type based on 
standardized codes, like the Rome code of Pôle emploi, has an impact on the 
profile of applicants presented by the channels. Depending on their capacity to 
adjust their labor quality conventions, firms can value or not these new appli-
cants. Small firms often criticize Pôle emploi for its irrelevant Rome code and 
the low quality of the applicants that the public employment agency sends 
(Salognon and Rieucau 2014). For instance, these applicants are valued by Pôle 
emploi on the base of “industrial” qualities whereas the social skills, which 
employers value in non-organized markets, are ignored (Lendaro and Imdorf 
2012); there is a risk of no common definition of quality between these em-
ployers and Pôle emploi. The public employment agency can enable firms to 
reach a labor supply that they value only if caseworkers and recruiters share the 
same language to delimit and qualify the labor market. Paradoxically, it is the 
case with recruiters in large firms that have no such need of a free-of-charge 
way of recruiting, unlike employers in small firms. 
As these examples point out, by assuming that the functioning of labor mar-
kets and their related coordination failures are derived from the recruitment 
channels that firms choose, the conventionalist approach is a fruitful frame-
work to renew the understanding of matching dynamics and the employment 
policies for improving their efficiency. 
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